We deal with the oligopoly model introduced by Gary M. Erickson in 2009 to describe dynamic advertising competition. In the original article the feedback Nash equilibrium and the steady-state sales are characterized. Here, we analyze the same model under the open-loop information structure assumption, we obtain a Nash equilibrium and we prove that this is different than the feedback one. In the symmetric instance of the model we can compare the equilibria in the two information structures and we find that the open-loop Nash equilibrium requires greater advertising efforts and leads to higher steady-state sale levels.
Introduction
In the seminal paper by Gray M. Erickson in 2009 [2] , the author introduces a dynamic marketing model to study oligopolistic advertising competition. One of the main interesting features of the model is that it allows the explicit characterization of the feedback Nash equilibrium advertising strategies and the steady-state sales. In this paper we consider the same model under the assumption of open-loop information structure. In general, it is well-known that these two approaches -feedback and open-loop -lead to different solutions [1, Chapter 4, page 87]. We observe the same phenomenon in the Erickson's oligopoly model: feedback and open-loop Nash equilibria exhibit different advertising strategy profiles. After characterizing the open-loop Nash equilibrium using the Pontryagin maximum principle, we focus on the model instance with symmetric competitors. The assumption of a complete symmetry among the competitors was already considered in Erickson's original paper and it is interesting because it allows us to obtain tractable formulas. Under this assumption we study the differences between the feedback and open-loop Nash equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe Erickson's model, its feedback Nash equilibrium and the associated steady-state sales. In Section 3 we characterize the open-loop Nash equilibrium and notice that it is different from the feedback one. In Section 4 we analyze the two equilibria in the symmetric instance of the model and we compare the two equilibria. Assuming that N is the maximum sales rate potential of the market, the sales dynamics of Erickson's model is similar to the dynamics presented by Sethi in [4] :
Erickson's model
All the competitors want to choose their advertising strategies in order to maximize their profits. For all i ∈ {1, ..., n} we define r i discount rate, q i unit sale contribution to the profit.
Finally, assuming quadratic advertising costs, we define the payoff of competitor i as the functional:
The following theorem is one of the main results presented in Erickson's paper and it characterizes the feedback Nash equilibrium of the differential game (1), (2).
Theorem 2.1 For all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, let D i be the unique positive solution to the non-linear system of equations
then the unique feedback Nash equilibrium of the differential game (1), (2) is
The feedback Nash equilibrium strategies meet advertising decisions better than the open-loop ones. Moreover, feedback strategies are subgame perfect, while open-loop strategies are not. Finally, feedback strategies allow advertising decisions to respond to possible strategy deviations by the competitors. Hence, the most reasonable equilibrium concept to consider in an advertising model is the feedback Nash one. However, for some differential games the open-loop and the feedback Nash equilibrium turn out to be equivalent [3] . In this paper we want to find an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the differential game (1), (2) and to compare it with the feedback one characterized by Erickson, in order to show out similarities or differences.
3 Open-loop information structure Theorem 3.1 For all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, let ∆ i be a positive solution of the non-linear system of equations
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the differential game (1), (2) .
Before presenting the proof, we note that the two equations (3) and (5) are slightly different (see the multiplicative factor 1/2 in the second and third terms of formula (3) and 1/4 in the same terms of formula (5)). This entails that the two equilibria (4) and (6) are different.
Proof The current value Hamiltonian for player i's problem is
Maximizing the current value Hamiltonian with respect to a i we obtain
provided that λ ii (t) ≥ 0. We observe that a OL i (t) is really a maximum point because the second order sufficient condition holds. The adjoint equations arė
Looking for a constant solution, λ ij (t) ≡ λ ij for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}, we read them as
and, after subtracting the second equation from the first one, we obtain
Finally, substituting back into the first equation (10) and rearranging the terms, we obtain the non-linear system of equations
in λ ii with i ∈ {1, ..., n}. In the hypotheses of the theorem, ∆ i is a positive solution of the non-linear system (12), hence
satisfy the necessary equilibrium conditions. Such conditions are also sufficient because all the feasible state trajectories are bounded, and the Hamiltonian function of player i is continuously differentiable and concave in the state variables (see: [1, Theorem 4.2] ).
Symmetric competitors
In agreement with Erickson's approach [2] , we focus in particular on the game with n symmetric competitors, in order to obtain closed-form expressions for the equilibria strategies. In this context we compare the results (4) and (6), which exhibit the same analytical form:
The proportionality factor x is the positive solution of equation
for the feedback Nash equilibrium, while it is the positive solution of equation
for the open-loop Nash equilibrium. We observe that the difference between the functions on the left hand sides of (15) and (16) is strictly positive when n > 1. This allows us to conclude that the positive solution of (16) is always greater than the positive solution of (15). Therefore, the advertising efforts in the open-loop Nash equilibrium are always greater than those in the feedback Nash equilibrium. As far as the sales are concerned, the steady-state can be found substituting (14) in (1) and lettingṡ i (t) = 0. In both approaches we have the same analytical form for the steady state:
where x is either the positive solution of (15) or of (16), respectively. Consistently with the result on the advertising efforts, we obtain that the equilibrium steady-state sales in the open-loop information structure are greater than those in the feedback information structure.
Hence, the open-loop Nash equilibrium appears to be more profitable than the feedback one. This fact has already been met in other models: advertising efforts are lower if competitors are not forced to commit themselves to openloop strategies (see e.g. [5] ). Feedback Nash equilibrium takes into account competitors' mutual suspicions and opportunistic conduct, but these behaviors lead to lower level of sales for all the players.
